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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 1, 1996 Congress passed the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA) as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.1 The CDA 
amended section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934,2 which 
regulates obscene and harassing telephone calls, by adding a new 
subsection (d).3 Under the amended section, it would be illegal to use 
an "interactive computer service" to send or display any communication 
available to a person under eighteen years of age that, "in context, 
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or 
organs.'"' 
1. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. 5, § 502, 110 
Stat. 136 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (West. Supp. 1997)) 
[hereinafter "CDA'1, 
2. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994), 
3. CDA, supra note 1, at § 223(d). 
4. Id. at § 223(d)(A)-(B). 
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A broad array of charges were made about the parade of horribles that 
would result from the liability created under the CDA. Many felt that 
the CDA would have a chilling effect on free speech that would, in turn, 
threaten the new form of "community'' developing in "cyberspace."5 
Others questioned the necessity and/or appropriateness of government's 
usurping the responsibility for children's well-being-believing it is 
better left to parents.6 Still others feared the return of what they believe 
to be the overly-moralizing, self-righteous attitudes associated with the 
Comstock Laws of the late nineteenth century. 7 
This Article does not address the larger social issues .raised by those 
claims except to conclude that Congress's misunderstanding of, or 
disregard for, the relevant issues threatens the growth and well-being of 
online communities. Many have made legitimate and convincing 
arguments against the stated and perhaps less forthright goals of the 
CDA. However, the CDA is also problematic on a more fundamental 
level: it is filled with ambiguities and inconsistencies of language. 
The problems with the language of the CDA are the result of careless 
drafting and reflect an awkward and hurried attempt at compromise 
among congresspersons. The stated intentions of the CDA expose a 
general lack of understanding of the mechanisms and environment 
Congress sought to regulate. In addition, Congress revealed a remark-
able insensitivity to the First Amendment. Specifically, Congress 
misread ( or disregarded) the rationale permitting the abridgement of 
certain otherwise free speech in the broadcast medium and attempted to 
5. See generally Wll.LIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984); see also Glossary, 
PUB. RELATIONS J., May 1995, at 34 (describing the term "cyberspace" as: ''the virtual 
computer world and the society that gathers around it"). 
6. See Thomas E. Weber, Keep Out! Software Will Help Parents Screen 
Potentially Offensive Sites, Wt>J .. L ST. J., Mar. 28, 1996, at Rl4; Amy Dunkin (ed.), 
Cybersmut: How to Lock Out the Kids, Bus. WK., Feb. 12, 1996, at 98. See also 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment protects 
the right of Amish parents to refuse to send their children to high school). 
7. See Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of 
Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live 
Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 741 (1992); David M. Rabban, The Free Speech 
League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of the Free Speech in American History, 
45 STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992); Wade Rowland, The Communications Decency Act, 
Censorship and the Net (visited Jan. 29, 1998) <http://www.blue-cat.com/ 
bcat/articleS.btml>. 
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foist it wholesale onto a new and different medium. The result was a 
statute that was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.8 
Notwithstanding the CDA's shortcomings, it will be important to 
identify the most problematic features of the CPA and attempt to 
comprehend their meaning. On June 11, 1996, a federal court in 
Philadelphia ruled that the CDA unconstitutionally abridged rights 
protected by the First and Fifth Amendments.9 The Justice Department 
appealed that ruling and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on 
March 19, 1997. On June 26, 1997, the Court struck down the CDA, 
finding that in its attempt to shield minors from indecent material on the 
Internet, Congress had unconstitutionally abridged the First Amendment 
rights of adults.10 • 
Although the CDA is now dead, many in Congress remain adamant 
in their conviction that some form of regulation of cyberspace is 
necessary to protect the well-being of the nation's children.11 In fact, 
efforts to draft some sort of "CDA II" are already underway.12 
II. PROBLEMS WITII CDA TERMINOLOGY 
The wording of the CDA made it difficult to determine who would be 
liable under the law. Specifically, terms not clearly defined by the Act 
(''telecommunications device") or terms not defined at all ("telecommu-
nications facility") left a wide range of participants in the telecommuni-
cations industry unsure of their potential liability under the CDA. In 
addition, contradictory language associated with "interactive computer 
services" left providers of those services, including content creators and 
telecommunications equipment and service providers, unsure of their 
status under the law. 
A step-by-step walk through the CDA from the beginning reveals 
several problems and provokes as many questions. Some problems 
appear at first more compelling and far-reaching; however, even the 
8. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). 
9. ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A. 96-963, 1996 WL 65464 (E.D. Pa. Feb. IS, 1996). 
10. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2334. 
1 I. See generally Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, 
Mar. 30, 1995 s. Rep. No. 104-23 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S8310 (1995); Andrew 
Kantor ed., CDA Overturned, but Other Legislation Looms, INTERNET WORLD, Sept. 
1996, at 16. 
12. See Jane Black, New CDA Legislation Expected (visited Oct. 1, 1997) 
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,119380,00.html>; see also Washington Wire, 
WAU ST. J., Nov. 14, 1997, at Al (reporting that Sen. Dan Coats (R-Jnd.) recently 
introduced a bill to Congress dubbed "son of CDA" which would replace the CDA's 
indecency standard with a "harinful to minors" standard); see also discussion of"harmful 
to minors" standard, infra Part V.C. 
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wording with the most seemingly innocuous ambiguities posed serious 
problems for those trying to assess their exposure to the severe criminal 
penalties imposed by the CDA. 
A. Undefined Terms 
1. Reach Over Foreign Persons or Entities 
The :first sentence of the CDA, amended section (a)(l)(A) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, refers to activities "in interstate or foreign 
communications."13 It is not defined here or elsewhere in the CDA 
what Congress intended by including the word "foreign" or its expecta-
tions of whom the CDA might reach by its inclusion. The Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution14 grants Congress the power 
to create and enforce laws with respect to both domestic and foreign 
commercial activity.15 The legislative history of the Communications 
Act of 1934 notes that ''the general purposes of the Act make clear that 
the Congress intended to exercise its full authority under the commerce 
clause."16 Indeed, the word "foreign" is included in the original section 
223 of the Communications Act of 1934.17 However, that section 
referred only to communications by telephone, and therefore may have 
been limited to persons or entities affirmatively calling into the United 
States, purposefully employing the United States telephone infrastructure. 
While Congress in 1934 may have been exercising its ''full authority" 
under the Commerce Clause pursuant to the Zeitgeist of the times, 18 
13. CDA, supra note 1, at § 502(a)(l)(A). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
15. See Douglas B. McFadden, Antitrost and Communications: Changes After the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 469 (1997). 
16. See H.R. Rep. No. 90-1109 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1915, 
1919. 
17. 47 U.S.C. § 151-610 (1982), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996). 
18. In the years just prior to the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the 
Supreme Court struck down a number of laws supported by President Franklin Roosevelt 
on the grounds that they exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause. Many believe 
that President Franklin Roosevelt's proposed plan in the 1930s to ''pack" the Supreme 
Court by increasing the number of Justices sitting on the court prompted the then sitting 
Justices to later defer to the Executive and Legislative branches on the matter of the 
scope of the Commerce Clause. See Henry J. Abraham, Reflections on the Contempo-
rary Status of Our Civil Rights and Liberties and the Bill of Rights, 13 J.L. & POL. 7, 
20 (1997). 
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there are at least two reasons why it cannot be assumed that Congress 
meant to subject any communication with an in international aspect to 
the CDA. 
First, as discussed more fully below, the transparent methods by which 
pack-switched networks such as the Internet arbitrarily and inconsistently 
employ a foreign telecommunications infrastructure, even when the 
sender and receiver of a communication are next door to each other, is 
fundamentally different from ordinary telephony. This difference 
between voice communications contemplated by the Communications 
Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on the one hand, 
and the advanced telecommunications and information services 
contemplated by the CDA on the other, was not fully discussed in the 
legislative history of the CDA. Second, "foreign communications" per 
se were not discussed at all in the legislative history of the CDA of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The phrase, "interstate or foreign 
communications," was simply grafted from the existing parts of the 1934 
law. 
Because the amended section replaces the word "telephone" with the 
term ''telecommunications device," the appropriateness of including the 
word "foreign" may need to be reevaluated. The Internet, for example, 
employs "packet-switching" technology which breaks communications 
into parts and employs multiple, often geographically diverse, telecom-
munications mechanisms to deliver and then reassemble those parts.19 
The path of the message parts, and, therefore, the number and location 
of telecommunications mechanisms, is volatile and arbitrary from the 
perspective of the sender and receiver of a communication.20 One who 
sends a communication using a telecommunications device (depending 
upon how that term is defined) may in fact be employing a foreign 
telecommunications infrastructure, and thus be potentially liable under 
this section of the CDA. This may be the case even where the sender 
and receiver are within the same jurisdiction. 
It may be that Congress is attempting to reach foreign persons or 
entities who "reach in" to the United States via use of the American 
telecommunications infrastructure, even if they do so unintentionally 
(due to non-user-controlled packet-switching, for example). If the sender 
and receiver of a prohibited communication both reside in foreign 
19. See Christopher Libertelli, Internet Telephony Architecture and Federal Access 
Change Reform, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 13, 13 (1996). 
20. Packet-switching technology takes advantage of efficiencies in traffic flow of 
telecommunications. The route of message parts is determined by available capacity 
among several alternative routes. See John L. Keller, GTE Planning to Buy BBN, 
Internet Pioneer, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1997, at B6. 
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jurisdictions, however, the violator can hardly be said to be under the 
proper jurisdiction of Congress. Moreover, the protection of foreign 
"victims" is not Congress's concern. 
In addition, Congress may be seeking to ensure that violators of the 
CDA are not shielded from liability by the deliberate use of "foreign 
communications" to send prohibited communications. As explained, 
however, the route of any communication over the Internet cannot be 
directed by the sender. Moreover, from the user's perspective, the same 
lack of control over routing applies to all forms of telecommunications. 
Neither the user of a telephone, nor a computer with a modem, nor a 
wireless device is cognizant of, nor has control over, the route of 
transmission of his or her communication. 
Congress's use of the term "foreign communications" may reflect 
nothing more than its intention to reach prohibited communications 
initiated in foreign jurisdictions but which ultimately reach the United 
States. In this sense, the use of the term would seem to parallel the 
intention of the original Communications Act of 1934 regarding, inter 
alia, obscene or harassing telephone calls. Nevertheless, with the 
complex nature of modem telecommunications transmission, e.g. packet-
switching, and the convergence of distinct forms of communications 
across the telecommunications infrastructure (voice, data, e-mail, etc.) it 
may be that extending the CDA to "foreign communications" packs an 
unintended, over-inclusive punch. 
2. "Telecommunications Facility" and 'Vicarious Liability 
Amended section 223(a)(2) extends liability for prohibited activities 
under amended section 223( a)(l) to anyone who "knowingly permits any 
telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any 
[prohibited activity] . . . with the intent that it be used for such 
activity."21 Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the term "telecommuni-
cations facility" is not defined either in the CDA or the larger Telecom-
munications Act of 1996. 
Whatever definition is imputed to the term, at first glance it would 
seem unlikely that any person or entity controlling a "telecommunica-
tions facility" would unwittingly subject itself to liability under this 
section of the CDA since the wording requires both intent and knowl-
21. CDA, supra note l, at§ 502(a)(2). 
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edge. On the other hand, a precise definition of the term "telecommuni-
cations facility" will be important for Internet service providers {IAP),22 
so-called "interactive computer services," and even the "enhanced 
services"23 provided by telephone companies and others. 
Specifically, the lack of a definition for the term "telecommunications 
facility" renders it subsumable under telecommunication devices or even 
interactive computer services. Because sections (a)(l)(A)-(B) of the 
CDA contemplate communications "by means of a telecommunications 
device," telecommunications facilities must be distinct from mere 
devices in order to be spared under these sections. As discussed below, 
because telecommunications device is defined only with reference to 
what is not contemplated by that term, facilities that may be considered 
''telecommunications facilities" are even more vulnerable. Indeed, the 
intuitive relationship between telecommunications devices and facilities 
is obvious: one can easily imagine a telecommunications facility 
comprised of telecommunications devices. Whatever is to be understood 
by the two terms, the distinction between them must be made clear. 
In addition, telecommunications facilities may be subsumed by 
interactive computer services. At first glance, the distinction between a 
computer and an element of telecommunications equipment- "device" 
or "facility" - may seem clear. The definition of interactive computer 
service provided by the CDA, however, refers to (1) "information 
systems," (2) providing access "by multiple users to a computer server," 
and (3) "a system that provides access to the Internet." As discussed 
later in this section, telecommunications infrastructure providers such as 
telephone companies are increasingly and actively engaged in the 
provision and maintenance of information systems (e.g., frame relay 
service). 
Systems that provide multiple users access to a computer server 
necessarily use modems and, therefore, necessarily use "telecommunica-
tions equipment." By including in the definition of interactive computer 
service these systems and systems that provide access to the Internet, 
22. Internet service providers provide access to the Internet over dial-up telephone 
Jines. Some Internet service providers house server computers which temporarily store 
data for individual subscribers to access at will. The service house enhanced 
telecommunications facilities which provide speedier access to the Internet. 
23. Telephone companies, which are normally regulated as common carriers and 
are not liable for content traveling over their lines, may be liable in their .provision of 
enhanced services if they "create or control the intelligence" of the commumcation. See 
i,ifra Part II.B.3; see also, Anthony L. Clapes, Proceed With Caution-Information 
Superhighway Under Construction: Selecting the Proper Intellectual Property Right 
Paradigm to Apply to Passengers on the Interim-net, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
621, 624 (I 996). 
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Congress has forced the contemplation of at least some telecommunica-
tions equipment and infrastructure within the meaning of interactive 
computer service. 
The first of the two principal provisions of the CDA refers to 
communications by means of a telecommunications device. The second 
provision refers to the use of interactive computer services. Because it 
is arguably contemplated by both of these terms, a telecommunications 
facility, whatever it is, may be subject to virtually the entire CDA. 
Once telecommunications facilities are endowed with a precise 
definition, assuming that definition wholly distinguishes them from both 
telecommunications devices and interactive computer services, liability 
under the CDA as discussed at the beginning of this section appears 
limited to identical subsections (a)(2) and (d)(2) (addressing telecommu-
nications devices and interactive computer services respectively). 
In these subsections, liability is limited to those who "knowingly 
permit any telecommunications facility under his control [to be used to 
transmit a prohibited communication] with the intent that it be used for 
such activity." The wording provides the relatively lilnited reach to 
those actors with both knowledge and intent. However, as discussed in 
detail below, the question of control of telecommunications facilities is 
problematic. 
3. Online Service Providers, Internet Service Providers, and the 
CDAs "Control of Facilities" Language 
If the term ''telecommunications facility'' is to include the computer 
servers and broadband telecommunications lines used by IAPs,24 and 
if those facilities are deemed to be controlled by the IAPs, then IAPs 
may be liable under the CDA notwithstanding other language in the Act 
which would tend to shield them. Specifically, the defenses included in 
the CDA, discussed in detail below, arguably include language which 
would shield from liability all the typical activities of an Internet service 
provider. 
It seems clear that the commercial online service providers, such as 
CompuServe and America Online ("AOL"), control the systems to which 
24. Internet service providers own or lease a high speed, high capacity telecommu-
nications link to the Internet Subscribers to IAPs dial into the IAP's location via a 
computer modem and home telephone line. 
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their customers connect. On the other hand, most of the commercial 
online service providers also provide their customers with access to the 
Internet. The Internet and the thousands of computers and telecommuni-
cations facilities and devices that it employs are not controlled by any 
one entity. 
The question remains of whether an IAP such as AOL could be liable 
for material found on its proprietary system but not liable for material 
accessed on the Internet via AOL. Anyone who has used one of the 
commercial online services knows that this division in the application of 
liability would be cumbersome and difficult to apply and enforce. On 
the America Online service, for example, the distinction between content 
provided by AOL, its subscribers, or its licensed content providers and 
content originating from the Internet is becoming increasingly blurred. 
Because "hyperlinks" appear throughout the service by which one can 
seamlessly switch back and forth between AOL content and the Internet, 
all but the most experienced user may be unaware that he has left the 
confines of AOL's huge computer server in Vienna, Virginia. 
Thus, for AOL and the other commercial online services, liability 
cannot effectively be divided based on the origin of the content available 
on their services. Moreover, even if AOL and the others could shield 
themselves from liability based on the fact that some of their content 
arrives via the Internet, Congress's goal to protect children from obscene 
or indecent communications would be largely undermined.25 Indeed, 
because all of the commercial online services are currently considering 
providing access to their services through Internet World Wide Web 
pages, AOL and the other services could avoid liability for the prohibit-
ed acts of their subscribers and/or licensed content providers simply by 
changing the way their services are delivered. 
B. Unclear Definitions 
1. "Telecommunications Device" 
The first of the two principal sections of the CDA refers to prohibited 
communications ''by means of a telecommunications device." "Telecom-
munications device," however, is nowhere defined in either the CDA or 
the larger Telecommunications Act. The CDA provides that "interactive 
computer services" are not telecommunications devices, but othenvise 
25. In fact, because the commercial online services provide the lion's share of 
Internet access to private residences, their exclusion from liability under the CDA would 
render almost ineffective Congress's intention to provide for contributory or vicarious 
liability. 
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leaves the term undefined.26 An argument may be made that by 
subtracting interactive computer services, a term that is defined in the 
CDA, we are left with a more-or-less identifiable subset of equipment. 
Specifically, one might conclude that the term ''telecommunications 
device" seeks to update the word ''telephone" in the Communications 
Act of 1934 to include fax machines, cellular phones, pagers, and other 
voice or signaling-related equipment. 
The fact that the CDA attempts to exclude ''interactive computer 
services" from the definition of "telecommunications device" is 
unhelpful. First, it is unclear whether the Internet as a whole is to be 
considered an interactive computer service. The definition of an 
interactive computer service, provided in section 230(t)(2) of the CDA, 
includes "a service or system that provides access to the Internet." A 
self-contained computer server with a single connection to the Internet 
may indeed be owned and controlled by a single person or entity-a 
distinction that the CDA emphasizes elsewhere in the statute as one 
determinant of liability. The Internet as a whole, however, is neither 
owned or controlled by a single entity nor limited to even the most 
broad definition of ''telecommunications device." Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine a device or service contemplated anywhere in the CDA that 
does not, or could not, somehow relate to the Internet. 
Notwithstanding the undefined term ''telecommunications device," and 
the difficulties that arise when inferring which devices it contemplates, 
the use of the term "lmowingly'' effectively limits the devices and 
activities associated with them that are reached under that section of the 
Act.27 Telephones, fax machines, cellular phones, and pagers are all 
examples of point-to-point communications devices.28 Except in the 
case of a misdialed identifying number, a communicator affirmatively 
communicates with or to a specific person with those devices. Thus, one 
who initiates a prohibited communication to a specific person using a 
point-to-point device does so knowingly. In contrast, the use of devices 
contemplated under the term "interactive computer service"29 may, by 
the nature of those systems, result in a prohibited communication being 
26. CDA, supra note 1, at § 230(f)(2). 
27. CDA, supra note I, at§ 223(a)(l)(A)-(B). 
28. See Moskowitz, Robert, Nifty New Phone Features at your Fingertips; Enjoy 
Phones that Follow You and Make Calls Without You, INVESTORS Bus. DAILY, July 13, 
1995, at Al. 
29. The meaning of"interactive computer service" is discussed infra at Part 11.B.2. 
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received by a person protected under the Act without the lmowledge of 
the sender. 
The "intent" requirement of amended section 223(a)(l)(A) also limits 
the application of the Act to certain devices, the use of which may result 
in liability under that section. Subsection (a)(l)(A) requires the "intent 
to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person" to be liable under 
the CDA. This effectively precludes from the reach of the section the 
user of a point-to-multipoint3° device whose communication may reach 
an unintended recipient. 
Whereas, the "lmowingly'' and "intent" requirements may effectively 
protect users of point-to-multipoint devices such as computer networks, 
other language in amended sections 223(a)(l)(A)-(B) would seem to 
sweep in most devices not specifically included within the definition of 
interactive computer services.31 The CDA refers to the transmission of 
any "comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communi-
cation which is obscene. . . or indecent."32 An "image" is precisely 
what fax machines and other data-based devices transmit. In addition, 
the phrase "other communication" would seem to serve as a catch-all for 
any other communication not specifically associated with an interactive 
computer service, which is the only "device" the CDA tells us is not a 
telecommunications device. 
Thus, the intent and knowledge requirements of amended section 
223(a) together with the exclusion of interactive computer services from 
the definition of telecommunications device may effectively limit the 
kinds of devices contemplated under the section. Nevertheless, 
undefined terms in legislation aimed at the telecommunications industry 
is unproductive and unfair: rapid development of new technologies and 
convergence of the telecommunications and computer industries will lead 
to increased uncertainty in assessing liability under the CDA. Moreover, 
by employing another problematic term of the CDA (interactive 
computer services) in an attempt to enlighten the meaning of telecommu-
nications device, Congress has only further confused the matter. 
30. An example of a point-to-multipoint device might be a posting from a home 
computer to an electronic bulletin board residing on a server computer. From this 
bulletin board, multiple parties may have access. See Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious 
Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement 
Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. R.Ev. 391, 392 (1996). 
31. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 230(e)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. 
§ 230(e)(2) (West Supp. 1997)). 
32. CDA, supra note I, at§ 223(a)(l)(A)(ii). 
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2. Scope of "Interactive Computer Service" Under the CDA 
The CDA adds a new subsection (d) to section 223 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.33 This subsection imposes liability for knowingly 
using an "interactive computer service" to send to a specific person 
under the age of eighteen, or "display in a manner available" to a person 
under the age of eighteen, "patently offensive" material as measured by 
"contemporary community standards."34 
The "display in a manner available" language in this subsection is 
potentially the most far-reaching part of the CDA. It may reach anyone 
who posts objectionable material from anywhere in the world to 
anywhere on the Internet or other computer services. After all, without 
the use of filtering software35 or other blocking controls, postings to the 
Internet are available to anyone with access to one of the hundreds of 
thousands of servers connected to that ''network of networks. "36 
In addition, there is the ambiguity in the requirement of ''using'' an 
interactive computer service to be reached by the Act, and the non-
requirement of "initiating'' the communication. A similar ambiguity 
exists in subsection (a). With this vague language, Congress has left 
unanswered the question of what the difference is between using a 
service and initiating a communication. 
It is also important to determine precisely what is to be included 
within the meaning of"interactive computer service." Section 502(g)(2) 
of the CDA provides that the term has the meaning provided in new 
section 230(f)(2). That section defines "interactive computer service" as 
"any information services, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to 
the Internet . . . . " 
33. CDA, supra note 1, at § 502. 
34. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957); Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973). 
35. See supra note 6. 
36. The Internet is a "network of networks" because it is comprised of thousands 
of "local area" network&-such as those in the workplace or on college and university 
campuses. The networks are not directly connected to one another, but, rather, make 
"contact'' using communication protocols and address schemes. 
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However, subsection (e)(l) of section 502 of the CDA provides that 
no person will be liable under subsections (a) and (d) for having solely 
provided access or connection to or from a facility, system, of network 
not under that provider's control. The question then becomes, "Does a 
provider 'control' the facility, system, or network to which he is 
providing access?" 
An interactive computer service is the only potential victim of the 
CDA for which Congress has provided an allegedly complete definition. 
In its entirety, section 230(f)(2) reads: 
The term "interactive computer service" means any infonnation service, system, 
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system 
that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services 
offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
This definition potentially sweeps in everything from the largest 
telecommunications service provider ( even AT&T provides access to the 
Internet) to the one-man, one-computer bulletin board operator. In 
laying a foundation for the CD.Ns defenses to liability, however, 
Congress has confused the determination of the reach of the section. 
First, Congress explained that one purpose of new section 230 of the 
Communications Act is to overrule any case law which holds that an 
online service provider incurs liability for exercising control of the 
content available on its service.37 The purpose of the section was to 
pave the way for a defense to liability under the CDA. Section (e)(S) 
provides a defense to prosecution under the CDA for having taken 
"reasonable, effective, and appropriate" measures to block access of a 
prohibited communication to a minor child. 
Defense provision (e)(l) makes available a wide escape hatch for 
anyone "providing access to a facility, system, or network not under his 
control." Section (e)(3), in what at first seems redundant, clarifies that 
the defense is not available to a person who provides access to a system, 
facility, or network that is under such person's control or ownership. 
The suggestion seems to be that if a service operator owns or controls 
a facility, system, or network, the operator knows or should know of 
prohibited communications made by means of its systems. 
The result of Congress's patchwork of sweeping liability and broad 
defenses is a statute that does not know whether it is coming or going. 
To suggest that ownership or control of a facility, system, or network 
necessarily means knowledge of illegal actions by system users rises to 
duplicitous involvement in prohibited communications is unfounded. 
37. Explanatory Statement, infra note 105, at HI 130. 
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For one thing, as discussed later in this section, it ignores one hundred 
years of common carrier policy and regulation. Even a cursory review 
of the sound reasons for exemption from liability for common carriers 
would have revealed potential problems for the CDA. 
In addition, "adjusting" the sweep of section 230 by devising a 
patchwork of defenses is not responsible legislative drafting. Why not 
pull back on the broad definition of interactive computer services rather 
than limit liability through a series of defense provisions? 
3. Distinct Treatment of "Enhanced Services" and the Blurring 
Lines Between Common and Private Carriage 
Buried at the end of a section not directly relevant to the issue of 
service provider control of content is the following sentence: "Nothing 
in this section shall be construed to treat interactive computer services 
as common carriers or telecommunications carriers."38 
The commercial online services both provide access to proprietary 
systems under their control, and provide access to the Internet, which, 
of course, they do not control. Internet service providers provide 
connections to the Internet only. It is unclear, however, whether the 
ISPs are properly classified as common carriers, and thus not subject to 
liability for content, or exercise enough control over their system's 
content to be considered under subsection (d). 
Indeed, the CDA's unelaborated use of the term "common carrier" 
disregards a century of judicial and regulatory struggle over properly 
distinguishing between common and private carriers. At least as far 
back as 1889, the Supreme Court has said of the common carrier/private 
carrier distinction: 
A common carrier is such by virtue of his occupation, not by virtue of the 
responsibilities under which he rests. . . • A common carrier may become a 
private carrier ... when, as a matter of accommodation or special engaiement, 
he undertakes to carry something which it is not his business to carry. 
The Court thus suggested that a given carrier may operate as both a 
common and private carrier. When it undertakes its regular business 
activities, previously deemed common carrier services, it is subject to 
common carrier regulation. When it contracts to perform activities 
38. CDA, supra note 1, at § 502(e)(6). 
39. Liverpool & G.S. Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397,440 (1889). 
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outside the scope of its regular operations, activities are not deemed 
common carriage, it is a private carrier for that particular transaction.40 
More recently, regulators have determined that a carrier may serve as 
both a common carrier and a private carrier depending upon the 
characteristics of the telecommunications services provided. Specifically, 
common carrier provision of "enhanced services" will in most cases 
subject that carrier to distinct regulation as a noncommon carrier with 
respect to the enhanced service. Moreover, because the FCC has found 
that "complex communications technologies ... blur the line between 
common and private carriage,',41 precise line-drawing between and 
among telecommunications services continues to challenge regulators and 
their reviewing courts. 
In providing that interactive computer services are not common 
carriers, Congress presumably meant to deny those services safe harbor 
in traditional common carrier regulation. A service provider is a 
common carrier and is thus not subject to liability for the content of its 
transmissions when: (1) the carrier holds itself out as an indifferent 
provider, and (2) the end-user of the service designs and chooses the 
intelligence to be transmitted.42 
In the 1976 NARUC II decision, the D.C. Circuit Court found that a 
requirement that "has particular applicability to the communications field 
is the . . . prerequisite to common carrier status . . . that the system be 
such that customers transmit intelligence of their own design and 
choosing.',43 In other words, when the users of communications 
equipment or facilities control the content of their transmissions, the 
carrier is deemed neutral and is not subject to any liability arising from 
the contents of the communications. 
Importantly, the NARUC II court seemed to adopt a broad view of the 
behavior required by an end-user to meet the common carrier prerequi-
site of the "design[ing] and choosing of the intelligence to be transmit-
ted, ... any two-way use of cable in which the customer explicitly or 
implicitly determines the transmission or content of the return message, 
40. Id. 
41. Independent Data Communications Manufacturers Association Petition for 
Declaratoiy Ruling re AT &T's InterSpan Frame Relay Service, l 0 FCC Red 13717, 
13724. In addition, FCC rules impose common carrier status on Local Exchange 
Carriers (LECs) as a condition of LEC provision of enhanced services over the LEC's 
own network. Thus, a carrier that would otherwise be free from common carrier 
regulation in the provision of enhanced services is subject to such regulation if it owns 
the network over which the enhanced services are provided. 
42. See NARUC v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (1976) ("NARUC I"); NARUC v. FCC, 
533 F.2d 60, 610 (1976) ("NARUC II"). 
43. NARUC, 533 F.2d at 609. 
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satisfies [the] second prerequisite to common carrier status.''44 The 
court identified a burglar alarm system, ''whereby the customer intends 
and expects a message to be sent at the occurrence of a particular event, 
[as] an example of implicit customer control.',45 Indeed, the court 
determined that content control "may arise solely from the determination 
to transmit or not [to transmit].'>46 Thus, under the NARUC decisions, 
an Internet service provider would almost certainly be characterized as 
a common carrier. Indeed, ISP customers create the "intelligence" of 
their transmissions; the ISPs merely transmit that intelligence unaltered. 
It may be that in expressly removing interactive computer services 
from common carrier status, Congress sought to ensure that the 
classification would not be used to avoid liability under the CDA. It is 
inappropriate, however, to remove interactive computer services as a 
whole without addressing the distinctions between and among members 
of that classification. Some members of the class may be more 
characteristic of a common carrier, others may be less so. 
C. Determination of Liabili'ty Under the CDA 
The Communications Decency Act modifies the Communications Act 
of 1934 by amending section 223(a) to include the use of"telecommuni-
cations devices" rather than simply telephones. The updated legislation 
reasonably seeks to prevent an escape from liability to those who 
intentionally annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another individual by 
means of non-telephone telecommunications devices. Such telecommu-
nications devices used to violate the section could include fax machines, 
pagers, and wireless communications devices. Because telecommunica-
tions device is left undefined in the CDA, however, it is difficult to 
determine the range of devices within reach of the subsection. 
The CDA also adds a new subsection (d) to section 223 of the original 
Communications Act. Subsection ( d) extends liability to anyone who 
uses an interactive computer service to "make available" to a person 
under the age of eighteen a communication that, in context, is patently 
offensive. The subsection is distinct from subsection (a) in two ways: 
(1) it refers to the use of interactive computer services, services that the 
44. Id. at 610 (emphasis added). 
45. Id. at n.46. 
46. Id. at 610. 
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CDA advises are not telecommunications devices, and (2) knowledge 
that the recipient of a prohibited message is under eighteen is not 
required. 
The three problems that arise in subsection (d) are: (1) determining 
who is an interactive computer service, (2) adjudging "context," and (3) 
applying the "contemporary community standards" to determine patent 
offensiveness. The :first problem is discussed in detail later in this 
section; the second and third problems are discussed in Part ID. 
1. Overview of Affected Parties and Conduct Subject to Liability 
Amended subsection (a)(l)(A) reaches anyone who uses a telecommu-
nications device to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person 
(''harasser''). Subsection (a)(l)(B) reaches the harasser who transmits an 
obscene or indecent communication to another person whom the harasser 
knows is under eighteen years old ("pedophile harasser''). Subsections 
(a)(l)(C), (D), and (E) all reach the harasser who uses a telephone or 
other telecommunications device to harass anonymously, or to cause a 
telephone to ring repeatedly. Actual communication between the 
harasser and his intended victim is not necessary (thereby including a 
"crank caller"). 
These provisions update existing law by extending liability to the use 
of telecommunications devices other than telephones. Because both 
knowledge ( of under-aged recipients) and intent to harass are required, 
the provisions do not appear to reach significantly or unreasonably 
beyond existing law. 
As discussed below, because telecommunications device is not defined 
in the CDA, point-to-multipoint communications such as e-mail and 
bulletin board postings may be swept into the subsection. On the other 
hand, because interactive computer services are expressly excluded from 
the definition of telecommunications device, most point-to-multipoint 
communications may be protected from these subsections. 
Subsections (d)(l)(A) and (B) reach the computer user who makes 
available to minor children communications deemed patently offensive 
as determined by contemporary community standards. A person in 
violation of these subsections is labeled under the CDA as a "computer 
offender." Because subsection (d) does not require intent, the provision 
potentially sweeps in anyone who contributes to a "public forum" in 
cyberspace any material that may unintentionally find its way to a minor 
child. Moreover, because "patent offensiveness" is to be determined by 
"contemporary community standards," indistinct and/or meaningless 
jurisdictional boundaries within the communities of cyberspace may lead 
to the application of the most conservative standards to all cybercitizens. 
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Subsections (a)(2) and (d)(2) reach anyone who permits his telecom-
munications facility to be used to violate the provisions of the CDA with 
the intent that the facility be used for such activities (''passive offender"). 
Because telecommunications facility is not defined in the• CDA, the 
passive offender potentially runs the gamut from the largest telecommu-
nications infrastructure and service provider to a home-based computer 
used to "host" a small cyber-community. Despite the non-acknowledg-
ment of the distinction for liability purposes between private and 
common telecommunications carriers, the intent requirement of the 
subsection may be enough to shield the truly passive transmitter. 
2. Section (a)(l)(A) 
As explained above, this section of the CDA updates the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 by replacing the word ''telephone" with the term 
"telecommunications device." The intent of the section, to prohibit the 
making of an "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent" communica-
tion with intent to "annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person," 
remains the same. Although the CDA does not provide a complete 
definition of ''telecommunications device," except to say that an 
"interactive computer service" is not one, presumably Congress meant 
to account for new types of personal communications devices such as 
fax machines, pagers, and cellular phones that might be used as 
effectively as a telephone to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another 
person. 
Because the subsection prohibits the making and sending of obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent images or other communications, 
however, the provision may reach significantly farther than it did under 
the original Communications Act. No longer limited to the spoken voice 
or other audible sounds, the subsection may reach a whole host of 
communications including literary and artistic works and the content of 
e-mail. Although many may decry the perhaps increased subjectivity of 
determining the lasciviousness or lewdness of an image, the subsection 
still requires intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass. Because the 
content of telephone conversations is, and always has been, subjective 
as well, it may be that the intent requirement effectively limits the 
potential over inclusiveness of the provision. 
The subsection also refers to the "initiat[ion of] the transmission" of 
a prohibited communication. Given Congress's clear intention elsewhere 
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in the CDA to provide for vicarious liability for the transmission of 
prohibited communications, the wording of this section may be of 
concern for telecommunications service providers such as telephone 
companies. However, transmission alone is not enough under this 
subsection. One must make (or create or solicit) and transmit the 
communication to be liable. Moreover, the wording provides that one 
must knowingly make and transmit the communications. Thus, 
"passive"'transm.itters of communications may be effectively excluded 
from liability under the subsection (a)(l)(A). 
3. Section (a)(J)(B) 
Subsection (a)(l)(B) differs from (a)(l)(A) in two ways: (1) when the 
person who makes and sends a prohibited communication knows that the 
intended recipient is under the age of eighteen, it is not necessary that 
the sender have initiated the communication, and (2) there is no intent 
requirement. Although the subsection does not provide an example, a 
reasonable interpretation of the first difference evokes the image of a 
minor child telephoning or otherwise contacting an individual who then 
transmits a prohibited communication to the minor child. 
4. Constructing a Definition of "Interactive Computer Service" 
In determining who is liable under the new subsection ( d) of the CDA, 
one must determine what qualifies as an "interactive computer service." 
Subsection (e)(6) informs that an interactive computer service is not to 
be construed as either a common carrier or telecommunications carrier. 
Subsection (h)(l) informs that a "telecommunications device" does not 
include an interactive computer service. From this, we know what an 
interactive computer service is not. 
A definition of interactive computer service is provided in new section 
230(e)(2): 
[A]ny infonnation service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. 
Arguably, any information creator or provider discussed herein, other 
than telecommunications infrastructure common carriers, could fit into 
this definition. 
We now know what interactive computer services are not and what 
they might be. Section 502(e)(l) provides: 
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No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) solely for 
providing access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not 
under that person's control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate 
storage, access software, or other related capabilities that are incidental to 
providing such access or connection that does not include the creation of the 
content of the communication. 
It seems, then, that regardless of what the definition of "interactive 
computer services" may include, liability under the new law only reaches 
those who truly have, and exercise, some editorial control over the 
content to which they provide access. 
Congress may or may not know that those providers currently 
exercising editorial control over their content ( e.g., AOL, CompuServe, 
etc.) have long since implemented controls that would appear to fall 
easily within the "good faith" defenses outlined in the Act.47 Perhaps 
Congress is really only after individual content creators-those who 
obtain or create "patently offensive" material and upload it to computer 
servers accessible to minors. 
5. Applications of Electronic Mail Mechanisms 
Amended subsections 223(a)(l)(C), (D), and (E) simply retain the 
provisions of section 223 of the original Communications Act by 
prohibiting anonymous or harassing telephone calls or causing another's 
telephone to ring repeatedly. As with the other subsections of amended 
section 223, the word ''telephone" is replaced with the term "telecommu-
nications device." Thus, one could deduce that the use of a fax machine 
or pager to harass another would be reached by the Act. Again, 
however, the undefined term ''telecommunications device" leaves precise 
application of the subsection ambiguous. 
Perhaps the most far-reaching application of subsections (C), (D), and 
(E) would be to persons using electronic mail (e-mail) anonymously or 
repeatedly with the intention of harassing the receiving party or parties. 
47. CompuServe has segregated adult-oriented content on its service to a separate 
area that can only be accessed by password. Similarly, America Online has "parental 
control" features that block adult-oriented material unless the subscriber affirmatively 
alters the control settings. Michelle Healy, Ecstasy Alert, USA TODAY, July 30, 1997, 
at ID. 
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Because postings to news groups and electronic bulletin boards (BBS)48 
employ e-mail mechanisms, the subsections may reach those who post 
without intending to communicate with any particular person. The 
potential liability for those who post to "open"49 groups or bulletin 
boards is enormous: an e-mail directed to an unknown party may find 
its way to the "egg shell plaintiff."50 
Specifically, one posting a communication to a wide audience on a 
bulletin board or an Internet newsgroup may find that what was intended 
to be merely provocative is perceived by some as harassing. In this 
way, the potential harasser may not be shielded by the intent require-
ment; after all, he intended to be provocative. Indeed, anyone who 
participates in online communications understands that the "faceless" 
nature of discussions can lead to misunderstood intentions that result in 
awkward or embarrassing (or worse) encounters. On the other hand, the 
CDA specifically excludes "interactive computer services" from the 
definition of "telecommunication device." Speaking to this issue, the 
CDA states that, "[t]he use of the term 'telecommunications device' in 
this section ... does not include an interactive computer service."51 
Thus, subsections (C), (D), and (E) may not apply at all to e-mail and 
the communications made to BBS's and news groups. Without more 
precise definitions of the terms used throughout the CDA, however, 
liability for prohibited communications through the use of such 
mechanisms cannot be determined. 
48. See Ferdinand M. DeLeon, Electronic Bulletin Boards Offer Forums to Share 
Interests, Friendship, SEATILE TiMEs, Mar. 12, 1995, at Cl. 
49. There are several different types of virtual groups whose members communi-
cate using computers. Usenet and Netnews groups, for example, are accessed via the 
Internet and are available indiscriminately to anyone who has access to the Internet, 
Groups on the commercial online services, on the other hand, are available only to the 
subscribers to the particular service. Finally, dial-up bulletin boards reside on a single 
"host'' computer and are accessed by individuals over phone lines by calling into the 
host computer. 
SO. See generally Aya V. Matsumoto, Reforming the Reform: Mental Stress Claims 
Under California's Workers' Compensation System, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1327 (1994); 
J. Hou!t Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 
273 (1995); Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing 
Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at 
Fault, 46 VAND. L. Rl!v. 121 (1993). 
51. CDA, supra note l, at§ 223(b)(l)(B). 
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D. Defenses to Liability Included in the CDA 
I. First Amendment Challenges to Statutory Defenses 
Section 502(e)(5)(A) provides a defense for those providers who, 
"ha[ve] taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate 
actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors 
to a communication specified [in the CDAJ .... " These measures may 
include software designed to filter out objectionable material, training for 
parents and children on "responsible use of computers," or requiring 
access codes, passwords, or credit card numbers to access certain 
materials.52 It is impossible to determine, however, which blocking 
mechanisms would qualify under the CDA as "effective," if any. 
Moreover, because of the rapid growth of online communications, the 
evolution of the telecommunications technology it employs, and the 
changing nature of its protocols, blocking mechanisms deemed 
"effective" under the Act today may be obsolete tomorrow. 
Subsection 223(e)(l) provides a defense for service providers who 
provide access to materials not under their control. A spokesperson for 
Senator Exon (the chief sponsor of the CDA) recently explained that this 
defense would protect, for example, commercial online service provider 
America Online for providing access to the World Wide Web that results 
in a minor receiving prohibited materials.53 Although it may seem 
reassuring that a spokesperson for one of the CDA's creators has 
publicly expressed this view, it is by no means clear from the wording 
of the Act that Congress intended to so severely limit the reach of the 
CDA. America Online creates its own content, monitors activity on its 
52. Section 230(c)(2)(A) provides: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of . • • any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to 
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objection-
able, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected. 
Many have interpreted this language to contemplate widely-available filtering or 
screening software to block material from appearing on a user's computer monitor. 
What Decision on Internet Decency Means, A'ILANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., June 13, 
1996, at E4. 
53. See Statement of Chris McLean, FED. COMM. BAR AsS"N NEWSL., Mar. 1996, 
at 20 •• 
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service, provides access to the Internet, and owns much of the telecom-
munications and computer infrastructure it employs. If a commercial 
online service provider such as this is immune from liability under the 
CDA, it is difficult to imagine who Congress seeks to reach in the first 
place. Indeed, if the intent of the CDA is to reach only the demented 
pedophile, sitting at home in front of his computer devising ways to 
offend intended victims, it is difficult to understand the sweeping nature 
of the legislation. 
2. Limits on Defenses Provided by the CDA 
Subsection (e)(3) of section 502 provides that the defenses to liability 
under the CDA shall not apply "to a person who provides access or 
connection to a facility, system, or network engaged in a violation of this 
section that is owned or controlled by such person." The wording of 
this defense provision begs two questions: (1) the persistent and 
unanswered question of how a "facility'' is defined under the CDA, and 
(2) the problematic determination, addressed above, of what it means to 
control a "facility, system, or network." 
The limitations on defenses to liability provided in subsection {e)(3) 
are of limited reach, however, because they apply only to the defenses 
provided in paragraph (1) of subsection (e)(l). The defense to liability 
provided in paragraph (5) of subsection (e) of the CDA applies broadly 
to all liability imposed under amended section 223(a) and new section 
223(d). 
The CDA also provides that the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) may develop an advisory list to aid content creators and access 
providers in avoiding liability under the new law.54 Nothing in the Act 
suggests that compliance with the FCC's suggestions provides a legal 
defense or "safe harbor"55 from liability. 
3. Adequacy of CDA Defenses 
The question of whether service providers control their content is even 
more problematic for Internet service providers. Many view ISPs as 
mere "onramps" to the Internet-completely neutral common carriers 
neither exercising editorial control over the content provided through 
their facilities nor having knowledge of their potential liability. 
54. CDA, supra note I, at§ 502(e)(6). 
55. See Richard C. Turkington, Safe Harbors and Stem Warnings: FCC Regulation 
of Indecent Broadcasting, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. LJ. I, 2 (1996). 
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On the other hand, one might argue that because the servers to which 
ISPs' customers connect are really something more than a data conduit, 
the providers should be held to a higher standard than, for example, a 
telecommunications backbone provider.56 Indeed, Internet content is 
stored in an ISP's server, however temporarily, and there is evidence that 
the ISP could, if it so chose, filter out certain "locations" on the 
Intemet.57 
The ambiguities of the "control" issue aside, subsection (e)(l) of 
section 502 seems to provide a defense for an ISP regardless of how it 
is conceptualized: ''No person shall be held to have violated [the 
CDA] ... for providing access ..• including transmission, downloading, 
intermediate storage, access software, or other related capabilities .... " 
The wording of this defense provision would seem to cover all the 
activities of even the most attentive ISP. Indeed, even some BBS's and 
"moderated"58 newsgroups may find shelter under this broad defense 
since most such systems are capable of fully automated operation. 
4. Determination of Liability for Parties 
Attempting to Control Content 
Section 509 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, familiarly titled 
the "Online Family Empowerment Act," reflects Congress's intent to 
overrule a New York Supreme Court case59 characterizing an online 
service provider as a publisher by virtue of the provider exercising 
control over the content of its service. The Stratton court found that 
"with . . . editorial control comes increased liability.',6° Because 
Prodigy had "held itself out to the public and its members as controlling 
56. A "backbone" is a high-speed, high-capacity telecommunications line to which 
thousands of separate telephone lines are connected. The backbone is capable of 
transmitting many conversations or data streams simultaneously. 
57. See Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Serv., 907 
F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Netcom system operators in that case 
admitted that it was possible for them to take affirmative steps to "screen out'' specified 
Internet content 
58. Many electronic bulletin boards are moderated, often by volunteers. 
Moderators perform administrative functions of the group, including screening the 
content of posted messages for materials deemed inappropriate for the subject of the 
discussion or pwpose of the board. 
59. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. 
1995) (not approved by Reporter of Decisions for reporting in state reports). 
60. Id. at *3. 
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the content of its computer bulletin boards," the service could not now 
deny liability under a publisher paradigm.61 
Although the Stratton case addressed a copyright issue,62 it was the 
court's imposition of liability on the service provider by virtue of its 
content control that Congress sought to undermine with the inclusion of 
section 509 of the Act. Because the Telecommunications Act is not 
meant to address copyright issues, even in the new context of 
cyberspace, it is reasonable to infer that Congress sought to ensure that 
online service providers would not be subject to liability under the CDA 
for exercising, or attempting to exercise, control over information 
content. Had Congress not overruled Stratton, the defenses provided in 
the CDA would be undermined or, at least, would be ineffectual and 
difficult to apply. 
Yet, in this respect, Congress seems to want to have it both ways. A 
narrow reading of the CDA would suggest that liability falls only to 
those content creators who proactively offend an intended target (or 
inadvertently offend a minor). A more broad though equally reasonable 
reading of the Act, however, suggests that any person or entity who is 
in any way involved with the creation, transmission, or delivery of an 
offending communication could be liable. In other words, Congress's 
overruling of Stratton implies that the CDA seeks to reach only the 
creators of offending communications, not passive transmitters; yet, the 
definition of interactive computer service as provided in section 
230(e)(2) of the CDA includes, "information ... systems ... including 
specifically ... system[s] ... provid[ing] access to the Internet." This 
wording suggests that Congress seeks to impose liability not only on 
content creators but on those who deliver the message as well.63 
·on the other hand, the Explanatory Statement accompanying the CDA 
claims that, "the conferees intend that [the defense allowed by overruling 
Stratton] be construed broadly to avoid impairing the growth of online 
61. Id. at *4. 
62. Id. at *4-*6 (holding that Prodigy was a publisher of statements concerning 
plaintiffs on its "Money Talks" computer bulletin board, and tbat moderator, or "board 
leader" of "Money Talks" BBS acted as agent of Prodigy). 
63. Despite the over inclusive wording of § 230(f), tbe Explanatory Statement 
accompanying the CDA claims: "Internet operators who provide access to the Internet 
and other interactive computer services shall not be liable for indecent material accessed 
by means of their services." Explanatory Statement, infra note 105, at Hl 129, This 
statement claims that any interactive computer service, from AOL to the Internet service 
providers, are not liable absent actual knowledge of and subsequent conspiracy to 
facilitate prohibited communications. If the CDA itself had been this clear, significantly 
fewer telecommunications and computer service providers would be in fear of the reach 
of the law. 
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communications through a regime of vicarious liability."64 The mistake 
that Congress made-to the detriment of a myriad of telecommunications 
service providers--was to not express this goal in the wording 
of the CDA. 
ill. CONGRESSIONAL, JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DISTINCTIONS 
BETWEEN "INDECENCY" AND "OBSCENITY" 
In addition to the ambiguities and contradictions with regard to 
computers, networks, and the instrumentalities of telecommunications, 
the CDA attempts to create and apply standards for use in determining 
liability under the Act. While the vague definition of terms such as 
"telecommunications device" makes precise application of the CDA 
difficult and confusing, it is the statute's imposition of ill-conceived and 
overbroad standards that poses the greatest threat to the already large and 
fast-growing cyberspace community. 
Congress's proximate use of the terms "obscenity" and "indecency'' 
reflects a disingenuous suggestion that the words are synonymous. In 
outlawing the dissemination of "obscene or indecent'' materials, 
Congress ignores a century of line-drawing between the terms and an 
evolution of their perceived meanings. Ironically, Congress has 
reassembled the essence of a sentence from a nineteenth-century law that 
regulators and the courts have spent one-hundred years deconstructing. 
A. The Comstock Laws 
Near the end of the Civil War, the U.S. Postmaster General reported 
that "great numbers" of "dirty'' pictures and books were being mailed to 
troops in the :field.65 Congress reacted by passing a law making it a 
crime to send any "obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print, or other 
publication of vulgar and indecent character'' through the U.S. mail.66 
Within a decade, Anthony Comstock, secretary of the New York 
Society for the Suppression of Vice, had successfully promoted an 
64. Explanatory Statement, infra note 105, at Hl 129. 
65. Robert Com-Revere, New Age Comstockery: Exon vs. the Internet, Cato Policy 
Analysis No. 232, June 28, 1995 (visited Sept. 11, 1997) 
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-232.html>. 
66. Post Office Act, chap. 89, sec. 16, 13 Stat 504, 507 (1865). 
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expanded version of the Postal Act.67 The new law was popularly 
named the "Comstock Law."63 In addition to the prohibition against 
using the U.S. mails to send obscene, vulgar, or indecent material, the 
new law made it a crime to distribute lewd or lascivious publications or 
pictures. 69 
Then, as now, the laws against obscenity, indecency, or other 
publications potentially offensive to some, centered around the perceived 
need to protect children. The laws responding to the movement led by 
Comstock were modeled after an opinion written in a contemporary 
English case, Regina v. Hicklin,70 which held that the test for obscenity 
turned on whether the material tended to corrupt the morals of a young 
or immature mind. 71 
The English court was concerned with the young or immature "into 
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."72 Neither the intended 
audience nor the "overall artistic merit'' of the material in question were 
important in determining the government's right to regulate distribu-
tion.73 
Despite the Constitution's First Amendment, literary artists and the 
particular tastes of mature adults faired little better in the United States 
during Comstock's crusade. The Victorian age's preoccupation with 
preserving the ''virtue" of young women was only one motivating force 
behind Comstock's success. He also crusaded against "dime novels" 
with tales of wild west gunslingers and big-city crime. Comstock and 
his followers in Congress denounced such materials as "the inspiration 
for all of the antisocial behavior exhibited by the youth of today."74 
67. Among Comstock's methods was the setting up in the Vice President's Office 
of what became known as "The Chamber of Horrors,'' for the pwpose of displaying 
materials that Comstock believed should not be available to the public, Com-Revere, 
supra note 65, at 2, 3. 
68. An Act for the Suppression of, Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature 
and Articles of Immoral Use, chap. 258, sec. 2, 17 Stat. 598, 599 {1873). 
69. See generally Jonathon Rosenoer, Indecent Communication (visited Sept. 9, 
1997) <http://www.cyberlaw.com/cylwl295.html> (discussing specific examples of 
"Comstock Law'' violations); Daniel L. Appelman, Policing the 'Net's Red Light 
District, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at Cl (discussing the strict application of the 
obscenity standards when applying the CDA). 
70. Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868). 
71. Com-Revere, supra note 65, at 2. 
72. See Regina, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371. 
73. Id. Some English judges found that literary merit compounded the danger of 
obscene materials reaching the vulnerable by virtue of their being "disguised" in a 
generally acceptable publication. Com-Revere, supra note 65, at 2 (discussing the work 
of EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERY\VHERE 12 (Random House 1992)). 
74. Blanchard, supra note 7, at 757. A more modem version of the concern over 
non-sexually-related materials and their effect on young or immature minds was the 1954 
congressional hearings about comic books: a child psychologist named Frederic Wertham 
1138 
[VOL. 34: llll, 1997] Cyberspace 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Comstock's activities, and those of John Sumner, who carried on the 
effort after Comstock's death, resulted in the destruction of hundreds of 
thousands of publications ranging from the work of early feminists 
(because references to abortion or birth control were often contained 
therein)75 to D.H. Lawrence76 to George Bernard Shaw.77 
The tide began to tum in 1932 when the newly formed Random House 
Publishing Company decided to publish James Joyce's banned Ulysses. 
When copies of Joyce's book were seized by customs officials, Random 
House sued in Federal court. The District Court's ruling and its 
affirmation on appeal created the standard that such publications must 
be considered in their whole.78 If a publication has artistic or literary 
merit when taken as a whole, it cannot be banned outright based on such 
isolated passages as may be offensive to some. 
The James Joyce case marked the end of the Rule of Hicklin that had 
been the basis of the Comstock Laws. The yardstick for the measure of 
obscenity would no longer be the sensitivities of the most vulnerable 
victim but rather the average person. The ground was now laid for the 
evolution of a new "indecency'' standard as the Supreme Court reviewed 
government action in the broadcast medium. 
B. Speech of "Minimal Value" 
As early as 1957, the Supreme Court, in Roth v. United States,19 
found that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social impor-
tance---unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the 
prevailing climate of opinion----have the full protection of the [First 
Amendment] guaranties."80 Because the Court has consistently held 
wrote a book in which he claimed that comic books were a leading cause of juvenile 
delinquency. Al; a result of those hearings, comic books were sanitized. Bob Gale, 
Fans of Sex and Violence Will Love the V-Chip, WAll ST. J., Feb. 21, 1996, at Al4. 
75. See generally Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case 
for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975, 1006 (1993). 
76. All copies of Lawrence's Women in Love were recalled and destroyed and the 
printing plates melted down. 
77. Comstock attacked Shaw's play Mrs. Warren's Profession because it dealt with 
prostitution. In response, Shaw coined the tenn "Comstockery" in his own effort to 
combat overzealous moralizing. 
78. See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 
708 (2d Cir. 1934). 
79. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
80. Id. at 484. 
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that obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment, any 
communication adjudged obscene necessarily must be devoid of "even 
minimal value." 
Sixteen years later, in Miller v. Califomia,81 the Court put into words 
the essence of the James Joyce case decided by a U.S. Court of Appeals 
in 1934, "[Obscenity] must ... be limited to works which, taken as a 
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which ... do not have serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."82 The Court's finding 
did at least two things: (1) it limited obscene materials or communica-
tions to those of a sexual nature, and (2) it provided four broad 
categories under which the requisite minimal social value may be found 
to justify the dissemination of otherwise obscene speech. 
When the Miller Court returned to the states and local communities 
the power to evaluate and suppress obscene speech, it may have been as 
much a matter of practicality as a precise reading of the dictates of the 
Constitution. In the decade and a half between Roth and Miller, the 
Court had become the final arbiter of obscenity determinations thirty-one 
times. The Justices may have tired of reviewing' speech which many of 
them undoubtedly found personally offensive, and admittedly were 
beginning to conclude that an opinion from an unreviewable, national 
court was not serving justice or the people effectively. Indeed, Justice 
Brennan eventually concluded that the government could not constitu-
tionally prohibit obscene speech at all.83 
IY. 'TWISTING IN THE WIND-THE FCC'S "INDECENCY STANDARD" 
The authors of the CDA suggest that the rationale permitting the 
regulation of obscenity and indecency in the broadcast medium should 
apply to communications in cyberspace. Indeed, the Explanatory 
Statement accompanying the CDA cites Supreme Court case law 
addressing broadcast regulation to support this proposition. In addition, 
the CDA invites the FCC to develop guidelines for those seeking to 
avoid liability under the Act. Thus, a review of the FCC's regulation of 
broadcast obscenity and indecency is important to understanding 
Congress's intentions with respect to the CDA. 
81. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
82. Id. at 24. 
83. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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A. Development of the Indecency Standard 
For the regµlation of broadcast indecency and obscenity, the FCC first 
looks outside of the Act under which it is authorized to regulate the 
airwaves in the public interest.84 Criminal Statute 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
reads: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by 
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both."85 Although only the 
Justice Department can bring criminal actions under the statute (and it 
rarely does so), the FCC may, under its authorizing statute, impose civil 
penalties on broadcasters who violate section 1464.86 
In addition, under sections 312 and 503 of the Communications Act 
of 1934, the FCC may: (1) revoke the station's broadcast license for a 
section 1464 violation, (2) issue cease and desist orders, and (3) impose 
fines against violators.87 Under sections 307 and 308, the FCC may 
deny renewal, renew on a temporary basis, or deny a broadcast license 
application for activities it deems violative of the law. Finally, under 
section 303(g), the FCC can use the broad power of its mandate to 
"promote the larger and more effective use of radio in the public 
interest. "88 
B. Reshaping the Standard After Miller v. California 
In response to Miller v. Califomia,89 the FCC released an order 
purportedly recasting its indecency standard in harmony with the rule of 
that case. The FCC found that: 
the concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of children 
to language that describes, in tenns patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
84. The Communications Act of 1934 authorized the FCC to regulate the airwaves. 
See Paul J. Feldman, The FCC and Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: Is There a 
National Broadcast Standard in the Audience?, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 369, 371 (1989). 
85. 18 u.s.c. § 1464 (1994). 
86. See Feldman, supra note 84, at 372. 
87. Id. at 372. . 
88. Id. at 373; But see Pacifica v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726, 778 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing)(finding that FCC does not have authority to regulate indecency independent of 
§ 1464). 
89. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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excretory activities and organs, at limes o.fo the day when there is a reasonable 
risk that children will be in the audience. 
Believing it was justified as the authorized regulator of the airwaves, 
the FCC reformulated the indecency standard it found in Miller to apply 
to the broadcast medium. The important factors noted by the FCC were: 
(1) unsupervised children have access to radio; 
(2) radio receivers are in the home, where people's privacy interest is entitled 
to greater deference; 
(3) unconsenting adults may tune into a station without heeding any warning 
about offensive language; and 
(4) spectrum scarcity justifies greater regulation of broadcasting than other 
modes of communication.91 
In addition, the FCC excused itself from two of the three prongs of the 
Miller test by making the questionable assertion that, for purposes of 
section 1464, the term "indecency'' is not subsumed by the term 
"obscene." Thus, the FCC was not limited under the section to the 
regulation of material that "appealed to prurient interests." The FCC 
also boldly declared that "when children are in the audience, [words 
deemed indecent] cannot be redeemed by their literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value."92 
C. Contemporary Community Standards for the Broadcast Medium 
The Miller Court also developed the "contemporary community 
standards" language first introduced in Roth. The social values of the 
locality in which the speech or communication in question is found are 
to be applied in determining whether such speech or communication is 
obscene.93 Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote: "[the First Amendment 
does not require] that the people of Maine and Mississippi accept public 
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York 
City."94 
In reworking its indecency standard after Miller, the FCC tagged on 
the words "in the broadcast medium" to the phrase "contemporary 
community standards." Thus, the Commission suggested that communi-
90. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 FCC 
2d 418, 425, Feb. 19, 1975 (emphasis added). 
91. Id. 
92. The FCC's order did, however, allow that the artistic, literary, political, or 
scientific value of indecent speech broadcast during "late hours" would be evaluated in 
considering sanctions. 
93. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 32. 
94. Id. See also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (holding that only obscenity 
is to be adjudged by local standards; artistic merit, etc., is reviewed under "reasonable 
man" theory). 
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ty standards are determined differently with respect to broadcast. 
Indeed, the implication was that the concept of "community'' may be 
distinct in the broadcast paradigm.. · 
The FCC did not define the "contemporary community standards for 
the broadcast medium." Thus, the issue of whether the rationale of 
Miller properly applies within a differently conceived form of "commu-
nity'' was left unexplored. Indeed, the community of the broadcast 
medium may differ in many ways. First, the geographic character of the 
community may vary dramatically depending upon nothing more than 
the power (reach) of a broadcast signal. Second, the demographic 
makeup of the community may include individuals or groups who would 
normally not be "connected" by the comm.on receipt of broadcast 
entertainment or information. Finally, the common understanding and 
experience of a "comm.unity'' may be entirely inapplicable to the 
broadcast paradigm. The "community'' discussed in Miller arguably 
assumed interaction between and among the members of that communi-
ty; the nature of broadcast, simultaneous communication from one 
"speaker" to many listeners, precludes interaction. 
D. Hamling and the Creation of a National Standard 
In 1974, the Supreme Court sought to abridge the use of its "contem-
porary community standards" test to judge speech on the basis of a 
decision maker's personal opinion or by its effect on a particularly 
sensitive person or group.95 The Court noted that by referring to the 
comm.unity standard in Miller, it did not require the use of any precise 
geographical area in evaluating obscenity.96 
In Hamling v. United States, the FCC saw an opportunity to justify the 
national standard that it had alluded to earlier by referring to a communi-
ty standard for the broadcast medium. In deciding that indecency would 
be determined by the FCC based on the "average listener," the agency 
was effectively admitting that a uniform standard would be applied. 
Although it did not preclude the possibility that the average listener 
would be determined on, for example, a state-by-state basis, no 
methodology was put in place for such review. Moreover, any argument 
that five commissioners sitting in Washington, D.C. could fairly apply 
95. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974). 
96. Id. at 103-10. 
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differing standards depending upon the locale of the broadcast speech in 
question was untenable. 
E. The English Rule 
The FCC applied its new indecency standard against the Pacifica 
Foundation for broadcasting what it deemed to be an indecent comedy 
monologue.97 When the D.C. Circuit court reversed the FCC's 
decision, the case went to the Supreme Court.98 The Court, while not 
explicitly ruling on the validity of the FCC's indecency standard, 
reversed the lower court's decision and affirmed and acknowledged the 
FCC's criteria by which it distinguished broadcast from other media and 
set it apart for more stringent regulation.99 
Despite the high Court's sanctioning of the FCC's methods and 
reasoning, it was several years before the FCC began to impose penalties 
under its indecency standard. Because the Pacifica case had been 
limited to a review of the particular speech at issue and the FCC's 
finding it indecent, the agency sought to clarify that it would not be 
limited to its prohibition of the particular words deemed indecent in that 
case. In attempting to cast its indecency net as widely as possible, the 
FCC provided that station licensees who broadcast indecent speech are 
only protected "when there is not a reasonable risk that children may be 
present in the broadcast audience."100 
V. THE INDECENCY STANDARD IN nm CDA 
A. Regulation in the Broadcast Medium 
Amended section 223(a) of the Communications Act prohibits the 
knowing, intentional transmission of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
or indecent" communications. "Lewd, lascivious, and filthy'' are terms 
neither defined by the CDA nor individually discussed in case law or 
FCC proceedings.101 "Obscene" and "indecent," on the other hand, are 
97. FCC v. Pacifica, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
98. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
99. Id. at 734-41, 748-50, 761-62. 
100. See In the Matter of Pacifica Foundation Memorandum and Order, 2 FCC 
REC. 2698, 2700 (1987). 
101. The Court in Pacifica noted that Justice Harlan had limited the phrase, 
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" to cover only that which was 
obscene. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740 (citing In Manual Enter., Inc; v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 
483 (1962)). The Pacifica Court went on to note that Justice Harlan's interpretation 
resurfaced in Hamling, again limiting the application of the statutory language at issue 
to that which was merely "obscene." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740. 
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terms specifically discussed in Supreme Court case law and FCC 
rulemakings. 
A defining theme in the use of these terms by the government as 
standards in broadcast regulation and the review of that regulation btf2 
courts has been the distinction between obscene and indecent.1 2 
When broadcast over the airwaves, obscene communications may be 
regulated by the FCC and are accorded no First Amendment protection 
of free speech. Indecent communications, on the other hand, are 
accorded some First Amendment protection, but may be regulated in the 
broadcast medium. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the reasoning of Congress that 
because the broadcast radio spectrum has long been considered a public 
resource of limited quantity, the government may regulate its use in the 
"public interest."103 In Pacifica v. FCC, the Court verified that the 
FCC may impose sanctions for the broadcast of material deemed obscene 
and that "indecent'' material may be restricted in ways tailored to prevent 
it from reaching children and others who may be offended by it.104 
B. Distinction Between Broadcast and Interactive 
Networked Communications 
In an explanatory statement accompanying the CDA, 105 the conferees 
charged with drafting the final version of the Telecommunications Bill 
reported their intention that the term "indecenct' was to have the same 
meaning as established in the Pacifica case.10 While acknowledging 
102. In discussing a statute at issue in the Pacifica case, the Court found that "[t]he 
words 'obscene, indecent, or profane' are written in the disjunctive, implying that each 
had a separate meaning. Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but the normal 
definition of 'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of 
morality." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-40. 
103. The Communications Act of 1934 provided that the Federal Communications 
Commission was established to regulate the radio spectrum for the good of the public. 
The Act was preceded by the Radio Act of 1926 which regulated the increasingly 
crowded radio airwaves at the request of radio station operators who were frustrated with 
signal interference problems. 
I 04. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50. 
I 05. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), 142 Cong. Rec. H1078-03, H1107 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996), 
for the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) [hereinafter 
"Explanatory Statement'']. 
I 06. Id. at HI 129 
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that "[t]he precise contours of the definition of indecency have varied 
slightly depending on the communications medium to which it has been 
applied," the conferees insist that the essence of the phrase-patently 
offensive descriptions of sexual or excretory activities-has remained 
constant.107 
Despite pending challenges to federal indecency standards, the 
conferees concluded that the question of whether indecency is overly 
broad is not "seriously at issue."108 From there, the conferees confi-
dently conclude that "[t]here is little doubt that indecency can be applied 
to computer-mediated communications consistent with constitutional 
strictures"109 in as much as the standard has "already been applied 
without rejection in other media contexts, including telephone, cable 
(television), and broadcast radio."110 
Notwithstanding their false assertion that the Pacifica case actually 
created or sanctioned a so-called "indecency standard," the conferees' 
bigger problem is that they completely ignore the Court's reliance on the 
unique characteristics of the broadcast medium. To suggest, as the 
conferees do, that ''there is little doubt'' that the prohibition of indecent 
material can be applied to cyberspace "consistent with constitutional 
strictures" is to ignore the Court's own words justifying the 
government's regulation of protected indecent speech in addition to 
unprotected obscene speech over the airwaves: 
Of all the forms of communication, broadcasting has the most limited First 
Amendment protection. Among the reasons for specially treating indecent 
broadcasting is the uniquely pervasive presence that medium of expression 
occupies in the lives of our people. Broadcasts extend into the privacy of the 
home and it is impossible completely to avoid those that are patently 
offensive.111 
In a one-sentence parenthetical explanation of the Pacifica case, the 
conferees reduce the Court's accordation of First Amendment rights to 
indecent expression to a slovenly, inconsequential right the loss of which 
we needn't lose sleep over: "describing indecency as low value and 




110. Id. See generally Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A 
Cal/for a New Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, I I 8 {1996) (showing that 
the regulation of broadcast media content has suffered little resistence from the 
legislature or the courts). 
111. FCC v Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 727 (1978). 
112. Explanatory Statement, supra note 105, at HI 129 
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conferees, given the "solid constitutional pedigree"113 of the indecency 
standard, its application to cyberspace "poses no significant risk to the 
free-wheeling and vibrant nature of discourse"114 found on the Internet. 
The drafters of the CDA either completely misunderstood the true 
nature of the Internet and other elements of cyberspace, or are 
disingenuously attempting to foist the regulatory justifications of a 
distinct paradigm onto a new medium. It is difficult to decide which is 
worse. Neither the Internet nor the commercial online services nor any 
other member of cyberspace is a broadcaster. 
Broadcasters cast their net broadly, and indiscriminately, over the 
"free" public airwaves. 115 All within the range of the broadcaster's 
signal who possess receiving equipment may perceive the signal, and all 
receive the same information or entertainment content. In addition, 
unlike "interactive computer services," receivers of broadcast signals are 
unable to respond or in any way interact with the originator of broadcast 
programming. 
In contrast, connection to the Internet, through an Internet service 
provider, is more analogous to the perception of a dial tone on a 
telephone set. The telephone system's dial tone is a neutral conduit 
facilitating access between a communicator and the listener of informa-
tion of his choice. All connections to "locations" in cyberspace are 
proactively initiated by users of networking equipment. 
The conferees claim that "prohibiting indecency merely focuses 
speakers to re-cast their message into less offensive terms."116 This 
over-simplified observation disregards Supreme Court law that acknowl-
edges that some material which might be deemed indecent by some, may 
have serious artistic merit or social value in other contexts. The 
conferees claim that because section 502(d)(l)(B) of the CDA prohibits 
communications which are, "in context," patently offensive, all otherwise 
indecent materials are exempt from liability under the CDA if they are 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Broadcast television and radio is said to be "free" to the consuming public 
because it is funded by advertising revenues. See Kathryn Seagle Robbie, Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC: The Supreme Court Establishes a Standard of Review 
for First Amendment Issues Involving Cable Litigation, 1 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 375, 380 
(1995); Toni Elizabeth Gilbert, Economic Regulation of the Cable Television Industry: 
Reigning in a Giant at the Expense of the First Amendment, 45 CATIJ. U. L. REV. 615, 
651 (1996). 
116. Explanatory Statement, supra note 105, at HI 129. 
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somehow adjudged valuable in an acceptable context. In adopting the 
Supreme Court's intention that the meaning of the term "patently 
offensive" should be determined by "contemporary community 
standards," however, Congress has once again either revealed its 
misunderstanding, or, at least, an under-appreciation, for the nature of 
the growing cyberspace community. 
Alternatively, and worse, Congress may intend to create and apply a 
"national standard" to be applied to all "American"117 cyberspace. As 
many fear, the standard to be applied could gravitate towards the "lowest 
common denominator," or most conservative community standard found 
in the service area of the Internet. Because all wide area computer 
networks, including the Internet, employ the national telephone 
infrastructure, there is virtually no physical or geographical limitation on 
the affected community. 
C. Lost Opportunities to Avoid Vagueness and Overbreadth 
Congress considered and rejected an alternative standard for the CDA. 
The proponents of the "harmful to minors" standard contended that, by 
expressly tying the standard to the well-being of children under eighteen, 
a "built-in" exception for material with serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value would have inhered in the CDA. The rejected 
standard would have contemplated the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
in Miller and related cases. 
Ironically, in the Explanatory Statement accompanying the CDA, the 
conferees of the final version of the Act assert that the proponents of the 
harmful to minors standard "misapprehend the indecency standard itself." 
In fact, it is Congress that completely misapprehends the indecency 
standard. Indeed, the so-called indecency standard finds support only to 
the extent that it applies to the broadcast medium. 
Congress is well aware, or should be, that what it refers to as the 
indecency standard was an invention of the FCC to be applied to over-
the-air broadcast radio and television. When the Supreme Court upheld 
117. The traditional concept of jurisdiction is an issue in cyberspace law and 
scholarship. Because the new communities fonning in cyberspace are said to be 
"virtual," i.e., they do not exist in geographical time and space, the jurisdiction, or the 
reach of the law, to which cyber-communities are to be subject is far from clear. At 
particular issue is domestic vs. international legal jurisdiction. Some have argued that 
a paradigm such as that used for the law of the sea should be developed. See Timothy 
S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty-The Internet and the Intemationa/ System, IO HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 647, 660 (1997) (discussing a French proposal for a charter for 
international cooperation on the Internet and the French government's "expressed hope 
that the initiative would lead to an accord comparable to the international law of the 
sea"). 
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the FCC's application of its standard in Pacifica, the basis of the 
decision was unequivocal: it was the unique nature of the broadcast 
medium that justified the limited infringement of otherwise constitution-
ally protected speech. Congress apparently believes that indecency as 
a standard is malleable and may be applied to other mediums at will. 
D. Defiance to the CDA 
On February 7, 1996 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and 
other groups announced their intent to file suit to challenge the 
constitutionality of the CDA.118 The CDA itself provided for an 
expedited judicial review of the much-anticipated constitutional 
challenges.119 The first challenge, filed in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, resulted in a limited 
Temporary Restraining Order (1RO) of one part of the CDA.120 
The voices of reason made three main arguments against the CDA. 
First, notwithstanding those libertarians of cyberspace who view the First 
Amendment as an unqualified dictate, the challengers acknowledge that 
some speech is unprotected. Indeed, obscene speech is already outlawed 
in cyberspace. 121 Rather, the challengers simply reminded the court 
that indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment and if it is to 
be regulated in cyberspace, a justification must be articulated similar to 
that articulated for broadcast. In order for the CDA to have been 
upheld, Congress would needed to have articulated a new justification 
for the regulation of indecent speech; the broadcast paradigm simply 
does not apply. Neither the scarcity of spectrum nor the pervasiveness 
of over-the-air "free" television and radio applies to cyberspace. 
118. See ACLU v. Reno, No. CN.A 96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *1 (E.D. Pa Feb. 
15, 1996). 
119. CDA, supra note 1, at § 561. 
120. The Temporary Restraining Order issued under ACLU v. Reno, stated: ''The 
defendant [the Justice Dept] . • . [is] hereby enjoined from enforcing against plaintiffs 
the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)(l)(B)(ii), insofar as [it] extend[s] to 'indecent,' but 
not 'obscene."' ACLU v. Reno, No. CN.A 96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *4. 
121. See 142 Cong. Rec. S. 687, 694 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) ("We already have crimes on the books that apply to the Internet, by banning 
obscenity, child pornography, and threats from being distributed over computers. In fact, 
just before Christmas [1995], the President signed a new law we passed last year sh111ply 
increasing penalties for child pornography and sexual exploitation crimes."). 
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Second, the challengers criticized Congress's claim that its misapplied 
indecency standard was narrowly tailored because suspect communica-
tions are to be reviewed "in context" for the depiction or description, in 
terms patently offensive, of sexual or excretory activities or organs. 
Supporters of the CDA argued that this "definition" of indecency would 
limit liability under the Act to communications more-or-less equated 
with pornography. 
What the challengers hoped to show, however, was that Congress's 
biggest mistake was its wholesale incorporation of the FCC's definition 
of indecency. It is well known that the FCC has regulated speech under 
its indecency standard that amounts to no more than the audio broadcast 
of four-letter words. To impose the restrictions on broadcast imposed 
by the FCC and upheld by the Supreme Court on cyberspace is to 
infringe upon free speech to a far greater extent than Congress claimed 
as its intention. 
Third, the challengers suggested that the penalties imposed by the 
CDA were far too severe to withstand the least restrictive means test of 
First Amendment review. Restrictions on some speech are justified and 
desirable in an ordered society. But to face a $250,000 fine and two 
years in prison for making a communication that some would find 
indecent almost implicates another constitutional standard: the prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. 
The efforts of the ACLU and other groups opposed to the CDA were 
rewarded. On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court struck down those 
portions of the CDA that would have exposed Internet and other online 
service users to criminal and civil liability for "displaying" or "making 
available to minors" material deemed indecent.122 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Communications Decency Act is filled with undefined terms and 
contradictory statements. Given the robust opposition to the Act and the 
rush to include it within the larger Telecommunications Act of 1996, it 
is not surprising that the myriad of last-minute compromises led to 
poorly drafted legislation. And the muddled wording has led to much 
confusion and possibly-unwarranted concerns. In order to calm the fears 
of those who believe the CDA is over-reaching and to aid those who 
would be charged with implementing it, Congress must make itself clear. 
In attempting to incorporate into the Act standards for regulating the 
content of cyberspace, Congress has disregarded the Supreme Court's 
122. See supra note 10. 
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treatment of obscenity and the development of the indecency/obscenity 
distinction. In addition, Congress has misunderstood the FCC's 
Indecency Standard and has disingenuously rationalized its application 
to cyberspace and the new type of community that exists and thrives 
there. By including the controversial "contemporary community 
standards" measure, Congress has revealed its misconception of how 
online communities are formed and the way in which their members 
interact. 
Congress has dismissed the Supreme Court's well-articulated reasons 
for extending less First Amendment protection to indecency in the 
broadcast medium. The justifications that inhere in the broadcast 
paradigm, that the radio spectrum is a limited public resource and that 
broadcast communications are pervasive, simply do not exist in 
cyberspace. Congress asserts that the CDA's defense provisions ensure 
that the law is narrowly tailored and thus is fortified against First 
Amendment attack. This shows a remarkable misinterpretation of two 
centuries of First Amendment analysis. 
Moreover, even if the defense provisions of the CDA limit its 
application, Congress has still discounted the non-legislative approaches 
to addressing its interest in protecting the sensibilities of children. 
Ironically, in attempting to shield from liability those who make "good 
faith" efforts to inhibit prohibited communications, the CDA itself 
mentions the ''blocking" software and other mechanisms that could be 
used to satisfy the goals of the Act. It is as if Congress is saying: "This 
law seeks to outlaw certain undesirable activity in cyberspace; and, by 
the way, here's a better way to address the problem." 
The CDA has two principal problems. First, its wording and 
phraseology are so unclear as to be void for vagueness. Second, and 
more importantly, its standards are overbroad and ill-suited for 
cyberspace. Many have decried the advent of online communities for 
their potential for harm----:including increased isolationism. Not enough 
has been said, however, about the opportunities for bringing people 
together. Indeed, many of the limitations set by geography, resources, 
and social inhibitions and hierarchies, are non-existent in this new 
community. The virtues and opportunities of cyber-communities are 
making their way to the populace; now is not the time to inhibit their 
evolution. 
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